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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000305 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, KDEM, RS SUBJECT: POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA FOCUSED ON PREVENTING PUTIN RETURN Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for Reasons 1.4(b,d) 1. (C) Summary: Leaders of the political opposition in Moscow discussed Russia's political future and the role of the United States in it with NSC Senior Director for Russia Michael McFaul. Opposition leaders believe that increased political freedom and serious measures to combat corruption can only be pursued if Vladimir Putin is prevented from winning back the Russian presidency in 2012. They also think that, with civil society ostensibly "asleep" for the foreseeable future, only a major national emergency has the potential to destabilize the current regime in the short-term. End Summary. 2. (C) On January 14, National Security Council Senior Director for Russia Michael McFaul met with Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov of the Solidarity Movement, Grigoriy Bovt of the political party Right Cause, and Vladimir Ryzhkov, former head of the now defunct Russia's Republican Party and professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. All four leaders view Barack Obama as a highly pragmatic president focused on external cooperation with Russia, but supposedly not willing to pressure the Russian government for greater political freedom. President Medvedev is not seen as a viable alternative to Prime Minister Putin, who they believe will likely retake the Presidency in 2012. This, according to them, will ensure that a corrupt and unresponsive government continues to run Russia. They agreed that the aim of the political opposition over the next two years should be to prevent the return of Putin to the presidency. According to them, however, given Putin's control over society only an emergency situation could bring about his fall from grace. 3. (C) Bovt argued that civil society was presently sleeping, and is unlikely to be drawn to active opposition of the current regime through any political process. He compared Putin's government to that of the Soviet Union, though Ryzhkov clarified that today Russians enjoy the freedom to a personal life and international travel as long as they refrain from criticism of the government. The majority of Russia's citizens, according to him, appear satisfied with the arrangement. Nemtsov added that the regime's weakness stems from societal problems that it refuses to address -- chief among them corruption. The group agreed that such corruption, which prevents the modernization of the country, leads to the theft of billions of dollars budgeted for social services and causes mounting deaths as infrastructure fails spectacularly across the country. The growing potential for large-scale emergency situations, according to them, is the only real threat of instability to the regime. 4. (C) The Opposition figures claimed that, to further improve relations between Russia and the U.S., the Obama administration has ostensibly refrained from vocal support for democratic reform. While this strategy was showing pragmatic results in the short term, they argued, Putin's return to the Presidency would only lead to a deterioration of relations with the United States. (NOTE: During the July 2009 summit in Moscow, the President met with a broad array of opposition, including those considered "outside the system" to the great irritation of the Russian Presidential Administration. END NOTE) McFaul opined that "de-Putinization" must come from within Russia, from a focus on civil education to broaden demands within society for increased freedom. Though the President may not be as vocal about his support for civil society within Russia as opposition members in Russia might prefer, McFaul made clear to this group, all of whom he has known throughout his career, that the President fully supports democratic reform in Russia. All agreed that dramatic change in the Russian political landscape would not take place in the near future. 5. National Security Council Senior Director for Russia Michael McFaul has cleared on this cable. Beyrle

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000304 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, RS SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS QUESTION THE RESET Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reason 1.4 (d) 1. (C) Summary: A group of civil society leaders told Senior Russia NSC Director Michael McFaul January 14 that they were disappointed with the perceived U.S. retreat on support of human rights in Russia. While they cautioned against returning to what they called the "aggressive" style of the Bush Administration, the activists requested more public criticism of the GOR's human rights transgressions. McFaul, however, pointed to an extensive record of public statements and private interventions by Administration officials, including the President. The activists also offered ideas for a new strategy of rights promotion, including isolating Kadyrov by improving relations with Presidents of other North Caucasus Republics. The activists expressed doubt that anything useful could take place in the Bilateral Presidential Commission Civil Society Working Group as long as Vladislav Surkov was involved, and suggested that independent Russian NGOs be allowed to help shape the discussion. McFaul emphasized that the Civil Society Working Group was only one small part of a much broader approach to fostering development of civil society and promoting democracy and human rights in Russia. End Summary. 2. (C) In a frank exchange at the Embassy on January 14, a group of Russian civil society leaders told Senior Russia NSC Director Michael McFaul of their disappointment with what they perceive as a U.S. retreat on support of human rights in Russia. Svetlana Gannushkina of the NGO Civil Assistance (who also works with Memorial and is a member of President Medvedev's Council on Human Rights) said that the human rights situation in Russia had sharply deteriorated in the past year, especially in the North Caucasus, where people are "trembling" with a fear that approaches that of Stalin's times. She insinuated that the "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations was stifling activists' ability to speak out on abuses, asserting that after the murder of Chechen activist Natalya Estemirova in July, Kadyrov "got the message" that no one was going to protest, which led him to conclude that he had carte blanche for more murders. According to Gannushkina, this in turn led to further killings, such as the shooting of activists Zarema Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov in August. (Note: The NSC, State Department, and Ambassador Beyrle all issued strong statements condemning the Estemirova killing soon after her body had been found. End Note.) 3. (C) When McFaul asked Gannushkina if she was implying that the "reset" meant a lack of understanding of the human rights situation on the part of the U.S., Gannushkina answered that "we don't see a reaction" to these abuses. McFaul refuted this point, noting the frequent official U.S. statements responding to such incidents. Gannushkina said that meetings addressing civil society concerns must take place with all four sides at the table, i.e. government and NGO representatives from both countries. McFaul pointed out that the U.S. attempted just such a meeting in July, only to have the GOR decide not to participate, adding that in the end, it is up to Russian activists to build a relationship with the GOR. Lyudmila Alekseyeva of the Moscow Helsinki Group agreed, saying: "We talk to Medvedev on the Presidential Council; why do we need to involve the Americans in this?" 4. (C) Alekseyeva told McFaul that, much as she appreciated the NSC statement protesting her brief detention at a New Year's Eve Dissenters' March (while dressed as Snegurochka, a Russian Christmas snowmaiden), there are more significant problems than "four hours of detention of one old lady," and the U.S. should not "stand by" as the other, more significant atrocities, continue to take place in the country. According to Alekseyeva, freedom of assembly is under siege in a widespread sense, due to the GOR's paranoia about the possibility of an Orange Revolution in Russia. Turn up the heat, but don't be another Bush ------------------------------------------- 5. (C) Yuriy Dzhibladze of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy told McFaul that Russian human rights activists hear what Washington is saying, but that he and other activists were skeptical regarding U.S. promises of continued support, and that the public U.S. statements after the death of Estemirova were "not enough." Dzhibladze said that two years ago, when U.S. officials asked his advice, he told them to tone down their criticism of the GOR, because their style was overly confrontational, and because anti-Americanism was rife among Russian officialdom (as well as in society as a whole). Dzhibladze now felt that the U.S. should strengthen its criticism, "not to become aggressive like Bush," but to make sure that human rights issues remain prominent on the agenda in bilateral relations. Acknowledging that the U.S. MOSCOW 00000304 002 OF 002 must strike a "delicate balance" between public criticism and private engagement, Dzhibladze nonetheless asserted that, as a "partner" of Russia, the U.S. "has the right to demand reforms" in exchange for trade or other concessions the U.S. might make to Russia. Dzhibladze also asked for more frequent opportunities to confer with U.S. officials. 6. (C) In response to McFaul's request for some creative ideas for a more effective strategy of human rights promotion, Memorial Human Rights Center board member and internet-based Caucasian Knot editor Grigoriy Shvedov noted that mere "scolding" was insufficient, and suggested that the U.S. form a more thorough partnership with local NGOs that go beyond mere financial support. Improving the life of average people in the North Caucasus would go a long way toward defusing the situation, he said. Lev Ponomarev of the NGO For Human Rights said that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov should be treated as an international persona non grata who runs a "totalitarian regime." Alekseyeva suggested sending a delegation to visit Ingush President Yanus-Bek Yevkurov, who "at least is trying." Such a visit could contrast with the shunning of Kadyrov, especially if combined with visits to other republics in the North Caucasus. (Note: The USAID Mission Director visited Ingushetiya December 16, and had constructive talks with Yevkurov's Prime Minister, Aleksey Vorobyev. End Note.) Ponomarev proposed holding an international conference on the North Caucasus, bringing in experts on the region to pool knowledge and resources. He added that the GOR has already created a working group on the North Caucasus, including human rights defenders within the GOR, such as Ella Pamfilova of the President's Human Rights Council, Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, and Public Chamber member Nikolay Svanidze. Concerns on the BPC ------------------- 7. (C) Dzhibladze asked McFaul about the status of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) Civil Society Working Group. McFaul assured him that the U.S. has no plans to capitulate to Vladislav Surkov, Medvedev's First Deputy Chief of Staff, and head of the Russian side of the Civil Society Working Group. (Note: As the reported architect of Russia's notion of "sovereign democracy," Surkov is the bete noire of the Russian human rights community. End note.) However, McFaul did note that it is not the business of the U.S. to dictate to the Russian side which NGOs should participate in the planned January 27 meeting of the BPC in Washington. Activists at the meeting differed regarding the usefulness of the planned topics of discussion, civil society's role in anti-corruption efforts, and protection of children from trafficking in persons and child pornography. Alekseyeva called the latter topic a "kasha theme" (i.e., feel-good pablum allowing the GOR to sidestep any hard questions about civil society), while Ponomarev asserted that children's orphanages in Russia currently constitute an "intellectual genocide," and hence it would be a topic worth exploring. 8. (C) McFaul explained that he envisioned that the Civil Society Working Group meeting would involve both a government-to-government session and a parallel NGO-NGO session, after which the NGO representatives would speak to the Commission. Dzhibladze suggested allowing the NGOs to create their own agenda for their meeting, and McFaul told him that this idea had President Obama's personal backing. While doubting the utility of the Working Group, given Surkov's agenda, Dzhibladze at the same time noted that joint work against corruption could be a way to force the GOR to address broader civil society issues, despite its plans to sweep such issues under the rug. Comment ------- 9. (C) From the critical comments by civil society activists, many of them are unaware of the contours of the Administration's approach to human rights and its record of public statements and speeches. We need to do a much better job of explaining publicly and, in particular, to Russian civil society actors, the "reset" and our overall approach to promoting human rights and democracy in Russia. Beyrle

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010861 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "DEMOCRATS" IN DISARRAY REF: MOSCOW 10620 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). 1. (C) Summary: Russia's "democrats" remain in near-terminal disarray. Personality disputes, disagreements over accommodating with the Kremlin, differences over the viability of political activity, and difficulties in political party registration undercut efforts aimed at uniting in advance of the 2007 Duma elections. While some believe the Kremlin wants a unified democratic (or "rightist") opposition, if only for appearances sake, the democrats remain stymied by Yabloko chairman Yavlinskiy's insistence on a paramount leadership role. In meetings with the Central Election Commission and other senior government officials, the Ambassador will continue to underscore concern over the failure of the Russian Republican Party under Vladimir Ryzhkov to be registered to date; separately, the democrats will need to make tough decisions about their political future. End Summary 2. (C) In recent introductory calls on Yabloko's Grigori Yavlinskiy and Republican Party's Vladimir Ryzhkov, a picture of disorganization, backbiting, and alleged pandering to the Kremlin emerged, further complicating the prospects of a unified democratic opposition capable of crossing the seven percent threshold to the Duma. ------------------- "Democrats" divided ------------------- 3. (C) The real issue, according to Ryzhkov, is that there are three camps within the democratic opposition: those who despise Putin and "argue for war crimes tribunals" (Committee 2008's Kasparov, former Prime Minister Kasyanov), who have scant public traction; those who are prepared to seek some degree of accommodation with the Kremlin (SPS' Belykh and Yabloko's Yavlinskiy) and in return allegedly receive party registration, under the table support, some access to the media, and occasional meetings with Presidential Administration Deputy Head Vladislav Surkov; and those, like Ryzhkov, who oppose Putin, but continue to play within a "managed" system and are denied party registration, as well as access to the media and Kremlin leadership. While Belykh doubted whether a union of rightist parties would cross the seven percent Duma threshold, Ryzhkov optimistically argued that they could garner between 10-15 percent of a general vote. However, Ryzhkov stressed that personality and attitude towards the Kremlin are significant hurdles to the otherwise rational calculus to unite. 4. (C) First and foremost, Ryzhkov, Belykh and SPS Chubays all agreed, Yavlinskiy is a pill, and his leadership of a combined democratic opposition would be a bitter one for many to swallow, given his insistence that all other parties subordinate themselves to Yabloko and admit to the policy errors of their past. Yavlinskiy himself told us that the other democratic opposition "will all come to me, they have no other option," given the amendments to the electoral law that encourage the consolidation of political parties. In his meeting with us, Ryzhkov accused Yavlinskiy of promising to "deliver" a united rightist opposition to Surkov, thereby rounding out the political spectrum. Yavlinskiy dismissed Ryzhkov as "a nothing," while insisting that if he had access to the media, Yabloko alone would draw 15 percent. Political consultant Dmitri Oreshkin told us that it's "psychological" -- Yavlinskiy does not want to come into the Duma as part of a rightist union, but as the undisputed leader of the "democratic" forces. When Duma member and Party of Entrepreneurs representative Oksana Alekseyeva was asked what was the main obstacle to a coalition of Russia's traditionally democratic parties, she said without hesitation: "Yavlinskiy." 5. (C) Second, tactics among democratic parties diverge. The Other Russia conference organized in advance of the G8 summit clarified the divisions: Yabloko and SPS rejected the conference outright -- Yavlinskiy declined to be one of a crowd, and Belykh said that he didn't like the company that the conference organizers were prepared to keep in order to show that opposition to Putin's Russia was alive and well. Outside observers, including Oreshkin, Indem President Georgiy Satarov and Ekho Moskvy chief editor Aleksey Vennediktov, endorsed the line that both parties chose to continue their tacit understanding with the authorities, according to which the Kremlin tolerates their fundraising and views them as politicians with whom they are prepared to do business. As evidence of this tacit accord some point to Surkov's invitation of both Belykh and Yavlinskiy to a public roundtable debate on his conception of "sovereign democracy." (In the case of SPS, Oreshkin argued that an additional MOSCOW 00010861 002 OF 002 factor dictating compromise with the Kremlin was Chubays' focus on securing Administration support for the reform of RAO UES.) While Ryzhkov endorsed the Other Russia conference, he subsequently repudiated Kasyanov's efforts to transform the conference into a party that would further Kasyanov's presidential bid. The Republican Party will no longer attend Other Russia functions. 6. (C) Finally, there are disagreements over the political landscape and room for maneuver in the presidential elections. Yavlinskiy was dismissive of electoral politics -- predicting that Putin's inner circle would prevail upon him to remain in power for a third term; indifferent to the unification of leftist parties -- characterizing it a Kremlin project doomed to fail; and fatalistic about his role -- arguing that he was waiting "for the fall" of Russia and devoting his time to preparing the next generation of intellectual elite. In contrast, Ryzhkov reiterated that he was prepared to play in the system and was actively working to establish credible party chapters, despite continuing difficulties with the election commission authorities, including the party's removal from the electoral list in Chechnya. Ryzhkov believed that there was still political room for maneuver, and heralded the unification of leftist parties as a "positive development" since it weakened the hold of United Russia. ----------------------- Ryzhkov's Moral Dilemma ----------------------- 7. (C) Ryzhkov acknowledged that unless he compromised with the Kremlin along the lines of Yabloko and SPS, there was little prospect of success for his party, which remains unregistered, and his political future. While he accepted this intellectually, he noted that morally it continued to cause him pause. Ryzhkov reiterated his rejection of the political stance of Kasyanov and Kasparov, stating that it was important to recognize Russia's political realities, and gave us the impression that he was leaning toward compromise with Yabloko and SPS. Ryzhkov requested US assistance in underscoring concern over the difficulties faced by the Russian Republican Party in securing its registration. While the CEC has until the end of the year to complete its review of the Republican Party, Ryzhkov predicted that the party's application would be rejected, following a series of "technicalities" that have plagued his party's efforts to organize over the last year. ------- Comment ------- 8. (C) As the rightist parties continue negotiations, many observers believe that the Kremlin also seeks a union of democratic parties, if only to round out the political spectrum and provide legitimacy to the electoral process. Efforts by Republican Party and Yabloko regional leaders in Astrakhan (septel) to unite are indicative of pressures within both party structures to create viable political alliances, and last year's agreement between SPS and Yabloko to join forces secured the democrats a presence in the Moscow Duma. The Ambassador will continue to raise the status of the Russian Republican Party in meetings with the Central Election Commission and senior government officials. BURNS